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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 11-1403
___________
JACK J. MINICONE, JR.,
Appellant
v.
ROBERT WERLINGER, WARDEN F.C.I. LORETTO
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 3-10-cv-00095)
District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
April 29, 2011
Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge, ALDISERT and WEIS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 3, 2011)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM.
As we write for the parties, we will limit our recitation of the facts
underlying this appeal. Jack Minicone, Jr., a federal prisoner serving a term of
incarceration imposed by United States District Court for the Northern District of New
York, argues in a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition that sentencing counsel was ineffective for

failing to argue for a lower sentence based on an amendment to the United States
Sentencing Guidelines—and, further, because the same counsel represented Minicone in
his first 28 U.S.C. § 2255 action in the Northern District of New York,1 that he should be
allowed to file in this Circuit via § 2241, as counsel could not have been expected to raise
an ineffectiveness claim against himself. Minicone avers that § 2255 is thus ―inadequate
and ineffective,‖ see 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), and that its application to his situation would
render AEDPA an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. The District
Court denied the petition.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In reviewing the denial
of a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition, we ―exercise plenary review over the District Court’s
legal conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous standard to its findings of fact.‖ See
O’Donald v. Johns, 402 F.3d 172, 173 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005); see also United States v.
Friedland, 83 F.3d 1531, 1542 (3d Cir. 1996) (―Our review of the district court’s order
denying . . . relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is plenary.‖).
As a basic matter, Minicone is not correct in his assertions of either §
2255’s ineffectiveness or its as-applied unconstitutionality. There is no constitutional
right to counsel in collateral proceedings. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555
(1987); Virgin Islands v. Warner, 48 F.3d 688, 692 (3d Cir. 1995). Thus, errors by
counsel in collateral proceedings—and, by extension, ―conflicts of interest‖ of this sort—
do not implicate the Sixth Amendment. If Minicone believed counsel to be ineffective at
1

Minicone v. United States, No. 5:97-cv-00519 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
2

the time of his first collateral attack, he had the options of retaining alternative counsel or
proceeding pro se. His decision to proceed with original counsel, and the consequences
deriving therefrom, do not implicate a constitutional failure in the implementation of
AEDPA.
Moreover, it is well settled that ―[m]otions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255
are the presumptive means by which federal prisoners can challenge their convictions or
sentences that are allegedly in violation of the Constitution.‖ Okereke v. United States,
307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002). The 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) ―safety valve‖ exception
applies only if ―remedy by [§ 2255] motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality
of . . . detention.‖ 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). Inadequacy is not presumed simply because
procedural requirements present an impediment to filing, as is the case here. See Cradle
v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538–39 (3d Cir. 2002).2 Rather, proper use
of the § 2255(e) as a method for invoking § 2241 is limited to rare circumstances, such as
when a petitioner ―had no earlier opportunity to challenge his conviction for a crime that
an intervening change in substantive law [negated].‖ See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245,
251 (3d Cir. 1997).
Here, Minicone had a full and fair opportunity to raise ineffectiveness
claims in his first 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, and was on notice via the plain language of
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Indeed, Minicone has filed multiple § 2255 motions, as well as motions for resentencing
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). See generally Minicone v. United States, 353 F. Supp. 2d
316, 319 (N.D.N.Y. 2005); Minicone v. United States, No. 01-CV-1969, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4012 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2002).
3

the statute that successive attempts to attack his conviction or sentence would be subject
to the heightened AEDPA bar. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). And since he is not prevented
from pursuing a § 2255 motion, ―habeas corpus relief is unavailable.‖ Application of
Galante, 437 F.2d 1164, 1165 (3d Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
As no substantial issue is before us, we will invoke our authority under
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 to summarily affirm the judgment of the District
Court. See United States v. Rhines, ___ F.3d ___, slip op. at 3 (3d Cir. Apr. 4, 2011, No.
10-4077). Appellee’s motion for summary action, to the extent that it requests
independent relief, is denied as unnecessary.
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